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ABSTRACT 
We present an extension of Bayesian networks to probability intervals, aiming at a 
more realistic and flexible modeling of applications with uncertain and imprecise 
knowledge. Within the logical framework of causal programs we provide a model- 
theoretic foundation for a formal treatment of consistency and of logical consequences. 
A set of local inference rules is developed, which is proved to be sound and--in the 
absence of loops--also to be complete; i.e., tightest probability bounds can be computed 
incrementally by bounds propagation. These inference rules can be evaluated very 
efficiently in linear time and space. An important feature of this approach is that 
sensitivity analyses can be carried out systematically, unveiling portions of the network 
that are prone to chaotic behavior. Such investigations can be employed for improving 
network design towards more robust and reliable decision analysis. © 1997 Elsevier 
Science Inc. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The study of Bayesian networks" is an important area of research in 
uncertain reasoning [21] with the potential for improving our understand- 
ing of learning, knowledge representation, and plausible inference in 
intelligence systems. Since probabilistic methods are epistemologically 
adequate to perform key patterns of human reasoning [7, 13], a large 
potential for practical applications exists. Bayesian networks are particu- 
larly attractive for expert-system development, because computationally 
efficient probabilistic methods have been developed and implemented in
commercial systems [18, 15]. 
Despite these virtues, Bayesian etworks are often criticized with regard 
to one crucial aspect [12, 23]: Exact probabilities connecting all relevant 
dependencies must be supplied to model an application domain. But most 
domains require reasoning techniques for coping with incomplete or 
imprecise information about the involved probabilities. In case of subjec- 
tive information, where probabilities are acquired from an expert agent, 
intervals are quite common, e.g. "provided that player A recovers from his 
injury on time, the chance that team X wins over team Y in next 
Saturday's football match is 80 to 90 percent." On the other hand, 
objective probabilities require statistical sampling where the wanted proba- 
bility can be derived only with some uncertainty; tighter intervals incur 
higher sampling costs in general. Therefore it is necessary to control how 
this uncertainty is accumulated while connecting several such uncertain 
statements within a deduction. Such knowledge can be represented suit- 
ably by probability inten~als which reflect bounds for probabilities. In this 
paper, a probability interval is described by an uncertain rule of the form 
U I U~ 
A -, B, which is interpreted as a range restriction for a conditional 
probability expression, i.e. u I _< P(B I A) < u 2. An advantage of this quasi- 
logical formalism is that it offers a declarative representation f uncertain 
knowledge [1]. The degree of imprecision is reflected by the breadth of the 
interval [u~, u?]. 
To date there are numerous publications on probability intervals and 
approximate reasoning techniques (e.g. [20, 2, 5, 3, 24]). In contrast with 
these approaches, we will develop bounds propagation methods with the 
objective of both computational efficiency and precise bounds" calculation, 
allowing for meaningful explanations and automated sensitil,ity analyses. By 
systematic variation of the probability bounds we can analyze the sensitiv- 
ity of the knowledge base. In particular it is important o identify the 
presence of chaotic behacior, where tiny changes in the input bounds will 
produce large changes in computed output bounds. Even if in the very end 
one intends to implement an application by conventional Bayesian net- 
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works with exact probabilities, the use of intervals pays off in the delicate 
knowledge acquisition phase. The results of such a sensitivity analysis can 
be employed to substantially improve the robustness and reliability of 
Bayesian expert systems for decision analysis. It may even reduce sampling 
costs by predicting portions of the network that don't require very tight 
interval estimates. Of course, this ambitious goal can only be achieved 
under certain restrictions: We consider causal programs where the rules 
describe a singly connected network. We chose a rule-based approach 
because of the nice model-theoretic semantics of these logical programs, 
which will be based on a probability distribution with binary random 
variables. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces 
causal programs as a logical formalism for Bayesian networks with inter- 
vals. The bounds propagation methods for these programs are developed 
in Section 3. Then in Section 4 the main soundness, completeness, and 
efficiency results are given. We analyze the sensitivity of derived bounds in 
Section 5. The bounds propagation methods are extended to networks with 
multiple parents (polytrees) in Section 6. Section 7 discusses related work, 
and finally in Section 8 we summarize the results and outline future 
research. 
2. CAUSAL PROGRAMS 
Instead of a Bayesian network with exact probabilities and its usual 
graphical representation, we choose to develop our approach within a 
logical setting, continuing the work in [6], [9], and [27]. In the sequel we 
will introduce causal programs consisting of a set of rules where we use 
intervals rather than point probabilities. Before jumping into technical 
details let us give an initial small example. 
Within some medical domain ~ consider a piece of knowledge bor- 
rowed from an example in [4]: "Metastatic ancer is a possible cause of a 
brain tumor, which in turn is possibly associated with severe headaches." 
A sample causal program, where A v~ v2> B denotes an uncertain rule 
U 1 U 2 
with a probability interval and A > > B represents two uncertain rules 
-2  B and X v2 B, looks as follows: 
A Ul U1 U1 U 2 
.20 .25 C -ancer ,  Cancer  .20 .30 .80 .90 f~ ) > Tumor ,  Tumor  ) ) Headache  
.01 .10 .50 .60 
Thus metastatic ancer occurs in 20% to 25% of all patients, and brain 
tumor is caused by metastatic ancer in 20% to 30% of all cases, whereas 
it has some other cause in 1% to 10%. The brain tumor itself is a cause for 
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severe headaches in 80% to 90% of all cases, but if it is not present, severe 
headaches occur in 50% to 60%. 
2.1. Syntax of Causal  Programs 
As usual in f i rst-order logic, we start with a short descr ipt ion of the 
a lphabet  of the probabi l ist ic language. The a lphabet consists of numer ic  
constants (like ".75"), predicate symbols (like "A"  and "f~"), connectives 
(hke , ,-- : -  , or ), and punctuat ion symbols. The predicates of 
the a lphabet  and their  negations are cal led basic predicates. The conjunc- 
tion of basic predicates A 1 . . . . .  A m (m > 0) is denoted by A 1 ... A m and 
is cal led the conjunctive predicate; in the case m = 0 we use the special 
symbol " f l "  for the conjunctive predicate• 
NAMING CONVENTIONS AND NOTATIONS Let U = [0, 1] be the unit inter- 
vall and let Q be the positive rational numbers including 0 and ~. Let 
V := {[Ul ,U2]  I U l ,U  2 E U ,  u 1 ~ u2} , 
Q:= {[a l ,a2] la l ,a  2 ~Q,  al <a2}.  
The elements in U are denoted by u, v, x, y, . . . , and the elements in Q are 
denoted by a, b, c . . . .  ; i.e., we use bold characters for intervals. I f  u = 
[u 1, u 2] ~ U, then u 1 := Ul, u z :~--- U2, U :=  (U l ,  U2) , and ~ := (u2, ul) , i.e. 
~, ~ ~ U 2. We use Greek letters for pairs of  boundary values. I f  a = 
(ul ,  u 2 )~ U 2, then a 1 :=u  1 and a 2 :=u  2. I f  a =[a  1,a z] ~Q,  then 
a 1 := al ,  a2 := a 2. 
The following definit ion of rules corresponds to the definit ion of  formu- 
las in f irst-order logic. However,  instead of forming strings of symbols of  
the alphabet,  we prefer  a two-dimensional  notation. For  instance, instead 
of A ~ Bu  we write A u , B, since the latter representat ion is more 
convenient. 
DEFINITION 2.1 (Probabi l ist ic rules) Let A ,  B, C be conjunctive predi- 
cates. Let u, v, x, y ~ U and a ~ Q. 
I! 
• A -* B is called an uncertain rule. 
u 
• A ~ B is called a causal rule. 
v 
• A .B  -~ C is called a causal rule with two causes A and B. 
l Probabilities are usually real-valued. But the real numbers are not countably infinite, and 
therefore we cannot use them for a formal system. For our purpose, however, it is sufficient 
to consider the rational numbers in U = [0, 1], which are countably infinite. 
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• A *-- 9 _ B is called a l ike l ihood rule. 
• ( A ,  B, C )  is called an independence rule. 
An  uncerta in rule of  the form 12 u , A is cal led an 12-rule. The 
justif ication of  the names for the dif ferent rule types will be clear as soon 
as we give the semantics below. 
DEFINmON 2.2 (Restr icted rules) 
u 
• 1~ ~ A is f~-restricted i f u I > 0 and u 2 < 1. 
u 
• A ~ B is c-restr icted i f  ~(u 1 = v I = 0) and ~(u 2 = v 2 = 1). 
¥ 
• A .B  ~ C is  c2-restr icted i f ~(Ul  = vl = Xl = Yl = 0) and -~(u 2 = 
Vz=X2 =Y2= 1). 
As  will be explained later, the restr ict ions yntactically guarantee that 
we can work with closed intervals. In the sequel all rules are assumed to be 
restricted. 
u, u2 B As a notat ional  convenience, for [ul,  u 2] ~ U we write A 
instead of  A t~1,,21 B. Fur thermore ,  for u ~ U the rule A ~ ~ B is 
def ined as A ~ u > B. Similar abbreviat ions are used for causal rules and 
l ikel ihood rules. 
DEFINITION 2.3 (Causal p rogram w.r.t, a causal polytree) Let V = 
{A 1 . . . . .  A n} be a set o f  predicates o f  the alphabet, 12 ¢~ V. Let ~ = (V, E )  
be a singly connected irected graph (causal polytree) o f  indegree 2. Let 
be a set o f  rules such that for  i = 1 . . . . .  n the following conditions hold: 
• A i has at most two parents; 
I1 
• i fA  i is a root, then ~ contains an 12-rule 12 ~ Ai;  
u 
• i rA  i has a single parent B, then ~ contains a causal rule B ~ Ai;  
• i f  A i has two parents B and C, then 9 contains a causal rule 
B.C ~ A i. 
Nothing else is in 9 .  Then ~ is called a causal program w.r.t. ~ .  
Each vertex in the causal polytree represents  a predicate which corre- 
sponds to a binary random variable, and the rules of  the causal program 
specify interval restr ict ions for a condit ional  probabi l i ty distr ibution. 
DEFINITION 2.4 (Probabi l ist ic queries) Let A be a conjunctive predicate 
and B be a basic predicate. A • B is called a query. Each basic 
predicate in A is called evidence; the set o f  all evidences is denoted by ~.  
In this article for simplicity we consider  queries where the predicates are 
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? 
not negated. A query A , B, which is posed to a causal program 9 is 
understood as a request to find the tightest probabil ity interval for the 
conclusion B under the total evidence A. 
2.2. Semantics of Causal Programs 
We define a probabil istic interpretat ion to attach a meaning to the rules 
of a causal program. 
DEFIMTION 2.5 (Probabil istic interpretat ion) A probabil istic interpre- 
tation J is a triple (1~, J, P), where: 
• 1~ is a nonempty set, called the domain of discourse. 
• J is an interpretat ion function which assigns to every predicate a 
subset of 1~. 
• P : f~ ---, U is a probabil ity measure.  
For  a given predicate A and an interpretat ion function J, we call J (A)  
an instance of A. In our set-theoretic view the instances J (A  1) . . . . .  J (A  n) 
of the predicates A 1 . . . . .  A n, respectively, are considered as elements in a 
least o--algebra sO. Thus we have a probabil ity space (f l ,  .~g, P). Therefore,  
the interpretations of (basic) predicates are also called (basic) events. In 
the sequel we shall repeatedly write P(A)  as a shorthand for P(J(A)).  
Numeric  constants are interpreted by themselves, i.e. in U. Basic and 
conjunctive predicates are mapped onto subsets of f l ,  that is, if A and B 
are predicates, then J (A)  c_ ~, J (A)  := 1~ \ J(A), and J (AB)  := J (A)  (3 
J(B). The special symbol "1)" is interpreted as the domain of discourse; 
i.e. J ( f l ) :=  ft. 
DEFINITION 2.6 ( Interpretat ion of rules) Let J=  (~,  J, P) be a proba- 
bilistic interpretation. A boolean function [. ~.s on the set of rules is defined 
as follows: 
F U 
• LA ~ B~j  i f fP (A)  > 0 and P (B IA)  ~ u. 
u 
• ~A ~ B~j  iff ~A u B) j  and ~XL  B~.  
¥ 
u v ~ x 
- -9  - - - )  - - )  • LA .B~C)~ iff ~AB CII~, ~AB C~]~, ~XB C)~, and 
FAB y C) j .  
• EA ~a- -  B~.y i f fP (A)> O, P(-4)  > O, P(B)> 0 and 
P(B IA ) :  P(B IX)  ~ a. 
• I~(A, B,C)i,.: iff P(B)  = 0 or P (AC I B) = P(A I B ) .P (C  I B), 
which will be denoted by I( A, B, C ). 
We say ..7 satisfies a rule r if Er~.7 holds. 
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U 
The intended meaning of an uncertain rule A --* B is as follows: The 
probabi l i ty for an event B, given an event A,  falls within the range u. The 
interval u is cal led the bel ief  (or bel ief  range) of the conclusion B under  
the premise A. 
Some addit ional  remarks are in order  here about the restr ict ions for the 
rules. These restr ict ions guarantee that we can work with closed intervals 
(i.e., all values within the specif ied boundar ies  are indeed possible for a 
suitable interpretat ion):  
U 
1. ~ --* B is l~-restricted: We want to chain this rule with a causal rule; 
X H 
e.g., consider f~ ~ A, A -~ B and suppose that u = 0. Then the rules 
y 
in the chain cannot be satisfied, since the first rule requires P(A)  = 0 
and the second rule requires P(A)  > 0. Similar arguments hold for 
u = 1 [since then P(A)= 0]. As we want to work with closed 
intervals, the f~-restriction is reasonable.  
U tt  Y 
2. A -~ B is c-restricted: Cons ider  the chain A ~ B, C ~ C, and as- 
V I '  y 
sume that u = u = O. Then the rules in the chain cannot be satisfied, 
since the first rule requires P(B)  = 0 and the second rule requires 
P(B)  > O. Similar arguments hold for u = t, = 1. As we want to work 
with closed intervals, the c-restr ict ion is reasonable.  
Similarly, the c2-restr ict ion is required for causal rules with two causes. 
Based on the meaning of rules, the understanding of a set ~,~ of rules is 
straightforward: We say J satisfies (or is a model for) 3 if J satisfies 
every rule in .~, i.e. 
EXAMPLE 2.7 (Metastat ic  ancer)  Consider  the causal program 
= {~.Q .20 .25> Ca nce r ,  Ca  ncer .20 .3o .80.90 ) ) ) Tumor,  Tumor Headache 
.01 .10 .50 .60 
and the following interpretat ion J=  ( I ' L J ,  P):  The domain  ~ = 
{t 1 . . . . .  tl000} is supposed to be a set of pat ients in a clinic. The predicates 
Cancer ,  Tumor,  and Headache  are mapped onto subsets of ~ as follows: 
J (Cancer )  = {t I . . . . .  t2oo} , 
J (Tumor)  = {t161 . . . . .  t240)  , 
J (Headache)  = {t  1 . . . . .  t96 ,  t169 . . . . .  t23z, t5ol . . . . .  /956}"  
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We place a uniform probabil ity distribution over the given domain, by 
defining 
P( t  i) = .001 for each t i ~ D.  
Now it is easy to verify that S satisfies all rules in ~.~; for instance, J
.20 .30 
satisfies Cancer  > , Tumor,  since P (Tumor  I Cancer)  - 40 _ .20 
.01 .10 
[.20,.30] and P (Tumor  I Cancer )  - 40 _ s0o .05 ~ [.01,.10]. 
An important model-theoret ic  oncept is that of consequences .  Let 3 
be a set of rules, and let r be a rule. We say r is a consequence of ~2, 
written ~2 ~ r, if for every interpretat ion Jr, " J  is a model for ~"  implies 
" J  is a model  for r ."  
In Example 2.7, e.g., 
{ ~,) .20 .25 Cancer, Cancer 
because P(Cancer) ~ [.20, .25], 
.2o .30 } .o5.15 
.01 .lO Tum°r ~ D Tumor 
P(Tumor I Cancer) ~ [.20, .30], and 
P(Tumor  [ Cancer )  E [.01, .10] imply P (Tumor)  = P (Cancer ) -  P (Tumor  I 
Cancer)  + P (Cancer ) .  P (Tumor  I Cancer )  ~ [.01, .151. 
If  r has weaker  hounds, then r is also satisfied. However,  we are only 
interested in those consequences which have precise (tightest) bounds. 
Precision is very important from the point of view of reliability: Probabil is- 
tic inferences must be accurate for making decisions under uncertainty 
and for detecting gaps in the knowledge base. 
DEFINITION 2.8 (Precise consequence) Let  ~ be a set o f  rules. 
• An  uncerta in  rule A > B is a precise consequence of,  3~, denoted  
~9~ ~ A U)B,  
precise 
/ff 
(V J :  [[~2~j impl ies ~A u > B~j )  
and (Vu ~u~: [~ jand~A " > B~j ) .  
• A l ike l ihood rule A *-- a - B is a precise consequence of  ~9£, denoted  
~9~ ~ A ~ a - B ,  
precise 
iff 
(V J :  ~2~. f  impl ies [A  *-- a - B~j )  
and  (Va ~ a ::l J :  [~ ' )~ and [iA ~ ~ - B ) j ) .  
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Intuitively, the probability intervals for precise consequencesare mini- 
mal w.r.t, the given knowledge in ~i'. An uncertain rule A , B is a 
precise consequence of ~ only if, on the one hand, each model of 0~' is a 
model of A > B (consequence part), and on the other hand, for each 
u • u there is a model of ~ '  U {A " > B} (precision part). This means 
that for all models of Ji' we have P(A)  > 0 [otherwise P(B  I A) is not 
defined] and that the closed interval u is equal to the set of all probabilities 
P(B  I A) which occur in the models of ,gL 
Analogously, a likelihood rule A * - -a -  B is a precise consequence of 
only if, on the one hand, each model of ~ is a model of A ~ 9_ B 
(consequence part), and on the other hand, for each a • a there is a model 
of ~ u {A *- -q-  B} (precision part). Then for all models of ,9~ we have 
P(A)  > 0, P (A)  > 0, and P(B)  > 0 [otherwise P(B  I A )  : P (B  IX) is not 
defined], and the closed interval a is equal to the set of all likelihood 
rations P(B  I A )  : P (B  iX) which occur in the models of ~i'. 
Based on the semantics of rules, we define the semantics of a causal 
program w.r.t, a causal polytree, where independencies are assumed im- 
plicitly as in Bayesian networks [18]. 
DEFINITION 2.9 (Bayesian model) Let 9 be a causal program w.r.t, a 
causal tree ~ = (V, E). A probabilistic interpretation J=  ( f~, J, P )  is 
called a Bayesian model of  ~ if J is a model of  9 and ~ is a Bayesian 
network w.r.t. P. 
A consequence of this definition is that all Bayesian models of a causal 
program ~ satisfy the same set of independence rules. These independen- 
cies can be identified by cutset separation in the corresponding causal tree 
,~ of 3 .  
LEMMA 2.10 (Characterization of causal programs) Let ~ be a causal 
program. Then there exists a Bayesian model ~ of  ~ .  
The proof of Lemma 2.10 follows from the existence of a Bayesian 
model for Bayesian networks (cf. [18]) and can be found in [28]. 
Based on the meaning of a Bayesian model, we can characterize the 
intended answer to a probabilistic query. 
DEFINITION 2.11 (Precise Bayesian consequence) Let ~ be a causal 
program. A u > B is a precise Bayesian consequence of  9 if each 
Bayesian model o f  ~ is a model o f  A > B and for each u • u there is a 
Bayesian model o f  9 u {A > B}. 
DEFINITION 2.12 (Precise Bayesian. answer to a query) Let ~ be a 
causal program, and let ~ = A , B. Then A > B is a precise 
Bayesian answer w.r.t. (~ ,  d?) if A u , B is a precise Bayesian conse- 
quence of  ~ .  
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Now how can we compute precise Bayesian answers? The key to the 
solution is to define logical inference rules, i.e. bounds propagation 
methods, which can incrementally combine a few rules into new rules 
guaranteeing precision. 
3. BOUNDS PROPAGATION IN TREES 
A naive approach to deriving precise bounds for causal programs is to 
apply the standard Bayesian methods for each combination of probability 
bounds, and finally to minimize and maximize the results. This approach, 
however, suffers from combinatorial explosion. But Bayesian networks 
constitute not only a Bayesian model of a domain but also a computational 
architecture for reasoning about uncertain knowledge. At each node of the 
network the belief is computed by fusing causal with diagnostic informa- 
tion. ~r-messages (causal support) are propagated in the forward direction; 
A-messages (diagnostic support) are propagated in the backward irection 
[18]. 
3.1. Propagation of Probabilities 
We adopt this inference mechanism for causal programs with Bayesian 
models where probability intervals are used instead of point probabilities. 
We will represent a 7r-message by a suitable uncertain rule and a A- 
message by a suitable likelihood rule. New local computation methods are 
developed for propagating and fusing this information. The bounds compu- 
tation itself is based on the following functions. 
DEFINITION 3.1 (Functions f, j~ and f) Let f :  U 3 ~ U and f :  U 2 × 
U X U--* U and f :U 3--*U. 
• f (u ,x ,y )  := u .x + (1 u)-y,  
{f (cq ,x ,y )  if x>y,  
• fi(c~,x,y):= f (cr2,x ,y  ) if x <y, 
• f(u,x,y):= [f(~,x,,Yl),f(h, x2,Y2)]. 
In principle, f, f, and f could be defined over real numbers, but the 
interesting properties of these functions hold for the restriction to tuples 
over U. Some elementary properties of these functions are given in the 
following lemma. 
LEM~ 3.2 (Properties of f and f) 
(a) 
f (u ,x ,y )= [ min f (u ,x ,y ) ,  max f (u ,x ,y ) ] .  
(u,x, y )~u×xX y (u,x, y )~uXx× y
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(b) f is continuous. 
(c) f (u ,x ,y )=Oi f f (x=y=O)V(u  =y=O)  V(u= 1A x=O) .  
Proof (a): min(u,~,y)~u×x×y f (u,  x, y) = min~,  ux a + (1 - u)y I = 
minus .  U(Xl -Y l )  + Yl =f (u ,  xl,Yl). Analogously, we get the maximum 
of f. 
(b), (c) follow from the definition of f. • 
The bounds propagation methods below make use of the precise 
consequence operator ~ , requiring an explicit listing of all relevant 
precise 
information in its premise. Therefore, implicitly assumed conditional inde- 
pendencies are made explicit now. 
LEMMA 3.3 (Propagation of exact probabilities) Let 
• ~= (A  u 
and z = f (u,  x, y). Then 
x 
) B ,B -~C, (A ,B ,C) , (A ,B ,C  
Y 
~A Z>c.  
precise 
Proof We have to show: A z ) C is a consequence of ~ '  and there is 
a model for ~'.  (This implies that there is a model for J~' u {A z ) C}.) 
1. Consequence: Let J be a model for ~q~, i.e., P(B  IA )= u, 
P( C I B) = x, P( C I B) = y, and J satisfies (A,  B, C)  and (A,  B, C). 
We have 
P(C  I A) = P(BC I A) + P(BC I A).  
From (A ,B ,C)  we get P(AC IB) = P (A  I B ) .P (C IB) .  Therefore 
P(B)  
P (BC IA)  = - - .P (AC IB)  = P(B  IA)  " P (C  I B)  = u 'x .  
P (A)  
Analogously, because of ( A, B, C)  we get 
P(BC I A) --- P (B  I A ) .P (C  I B) = (1 - u) .y. 
Hence P(C IA) = u . x + (1 - u) .y  = f (u,  x, y) = z, i.e., J satisfies 
A Z ,C .  
x 
2. Precision: The rules A u )B  and B ~ C describe a causal pro- 
Y 
gram for A = ~,  and for A ~ f~ these rules are part of a causal 
u x 
program (e.g. consider the rules f~ .5 ;A ,  A ~B,  and B ~ C). 
.5 y 
According to Lemma 2.10, there is a Bayesian model J for the rules 
of a causal program; hence J is a model for ~.~. • 
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THEOREM 3.4 [Propagation of probability bounds (PP)] Let ~' = 
x 
{A U~B,B~C, (A ,B ,C) , (A ,B ,C)} ,andz=f (u ,x ,y ) .Then  
Y 
~'  ~ A Z>C.  
precise 
Proof We have to show A z , C is a consequence of ~92, and for each 
z~zthere isamode l fo r~2U{A Z,C}.  
1. Consequence: Let J be a model for ~'. Let u = P(B IA)~ u, 
x=P(C IB)~x,  and y =P(C IB)~y.  From Lemma 3.3 and 
Lemma 3.2(a) we get P(C IA) =f(u ,x ,y )  ~ f(u,x,y) = z, i.e., J 
satisfies A z > C. 
2. Precision: Let z ~ z. Since f is continuous [cf. kemma 3.2(b)], there 
are u ~u,  x~x,  and y ~y  such that f (u ,x ,y )=z .  Lemma 3.3 
x 
implies that there is a model for {A " >B, B -*C ,  (A ,B ,C) ,  
Y 
(X ,~,C) ,A  z , c} .  • 
Theorem 3.4 allows us to propagate the influence of an evidence A on a 
node B to a node C which is a child of B in the causal tree (forward 
propagation). For A = D, we propagate bounds on absolute probabilities 
(i.e. background knowlege) instead of bounds on conditional probabilities. 
Theorem 3.4 provides us with a first inference rule PP. Application of 
this and similar rules will be denoted by the deduction operator "~- ", in 
particular " t- ". In general we shall suppress the independence assump- 
ee 
tions among the premises of the inference rule for notational convenience. 
To illustrate the forward propagation we refer to Example 2.7, where D 
is assumed to represent the patients in a given clinic: 
.20 .25> Cancer, Cancer .20 .30 .05 .15> D , Tumor I- D. Tumor 
.01 .10 PP 
,.Q .05 .15) Tumor, Tumor8°  .90 > Headache ~- D .51 .65 Headache 
.50 .60 PP 
Thus in the given clinic the absolute probability of having a brain tumor 
lies between 5% and 15%, whereas the probability of having severe 
headaches is in the range of 51% to 65%. In both cases, the resulting 
intervals are not much broader than the input intervals. Later we will see 
examples where the intervals tend to diffuse. 
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3.2. P ropagat ion  of  L ike l ihoods  
Likel ihood ratios are represented by rational numbers and by projective 
coordinates. If  a ~ Q, then 
( (a ,1 )  if a < 1, 
~a  := ~(1 ,1 /a )  if l<a  <o% 
~, (1,0)  if a=oo.  
On the other hand, if (u, v) ~ U e \ {(0, 0)}, then 
[ ] (u ,v ) :=u:v := [u /v  if v>0,  
oo if v = 0. 
Thus [2Oa = a; however, in general ~O(u ,  v) ~ (u, v). But ~[ ] (u ,  v) = 
(u, v) if (u, v) = ~a for some a E Q; i.e., for representatives, ~ [] is the 
identity function. The likelihood ratio u : v is undefined for (u, v) = (0, 0). 
Obviously, for (u, v) 4= (0, 0) and (x, y) ~ (0, 0), we have 
u : v = x : y ,~, uy  = vx ¢0 3/3 > O : /3 . u = x and  /3 . v = y .  
Moreover,  we have a total order on likelihood ratios (given by the order 
on Q): 
u : v < x : y ¢~ uy  < vx ~ 3/3 > O : /3 . u < x and  /3 . v = y .  
Given u <x  and v >y ,  we have u :v  <x:y .  For instance, 0 :1<.5 :1  
and .5 : 1 < 1 : .5 and 1 : .5 < 1 : 0. Moreover,  if a _< b and Oa = (a 1, a2), 
~b = (b 1, b2) , then a I < bl, a 2 >__ b2, and a lb  2 < a2b  1. 
The computat ion of l ikelihood bounds is based on the following 
functions: 
DEFINITION 3.5 (Functions g, ~, and g) Let  t I = (0, O, oo) and  t 2 = 
(1, 1, 0). Let  Dg = (U  × U × Q)  \ {t 1, t 2} and g : Dg --~ Q; let 
Dg = {(a , /3 ,a )  ~ U 2 × U 2 × Q I (aa , /31 ,a )  • tl, (%, /32 ,a )  v~ t 2} 
and ~, : Dg ---, Q,  let 
Dg = {(u ,v ,a )  ~ U × U × Q I (Ul ,V l ,a  2) ~ tl, (U2,V2,a 1) :~ t2} 
and g:Dg --0 Q. 
g(u ,  v, a )  := f (u ,  a l ,  a 2) : f (v ,  a l ,  a2) , where  ©a = (a  1, a2); 
: ~(a , /3 ,  a ) :=  f (a ,  a l ,  a2) :  f ( /3 ,  a l ,  a2),  where  ~a = (ap  a2); 
• g(u, v, a) := [min a ~ { . . . .  2} g(u'  ¥' a), max a ~ { . . . .  2} g(u'  V, a)]. 
For  (u, v, a) ~ U X U × Q and ~a = (a 1, a2), we  conclude f rom Lemma 
3.2(c) that f (u ,  a 1, a 2) = f (v ,  a l ,  a 2) = 0 iff (u, u, a) ~ {tl, t2}. Therefore,  
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the funct ion  g is not  def ined for the tuples t 1 and t 2. The constra ints  for 
the def in i t ions of ~ and g are analogous.  
LEMMA 3.6 (Propert ies  of g and g) 
(a) f (u ,  al, a 2) . f (u ,  bl, b 2) - f (u ,  bl, b 2) . f (v ,  a 1, a 2) 
= (U -- V)" (a lb  2 - a2bl) .  
(b) Let a 1 : a 2 = b 1 : b2, Then f (u ,  a s, a 2) : f (v ,  al, a 2) 
= f (u ,  bl, b2): f(u,  bl, b2). 
(c) g(u, v, a) 
= [min( ....... )~ u×v×a g(u, v, a), max( ...... )~ ,xvxa  g(u, v, a)]. 
(d) g is continuous. 
Proof  (a): 
f (u ,  al ,  a 2 ) • f ( t J ,  b l ,  b2) - f (u ,  b 1 , b 2 ) " f (v ,  a 1 , a 2 ) 
= [ua 1 + (1 - u )a2] .  [ub 1 + (1 - u )b  2] 
- [ub l  + (1 - u )b2]"  Ira1 + (1 - v )a2]  
= u(1 - v )a lb  2 + (1 - u)va2b I - u(1 - v)a2b 1 - (1 - u)va lb  2 
= (u - v) • (a lb  2 - azb l ) .  
(b): Since a I : a 2 = b I : b2, we have alb 2 = a2b 1. From (a) we get the 
stated result. 
(c): First, we show 
min  g(u ,  v, a)  = min  g(u ,  v, a). 
(u ,u ,a)EuXv×a (u,v,a)~uXv×{al,a2} 
Let (u ,v )~u ×v and a ,b  ~ a. For  u > v, a_<b,  and <Sa =(a l ,  a2), 
~b = (b l ,  b 2) we have alb 2 <_ a2bl, and f rom (a) we get 
f (u ,a l ,a2)  " f (v ,  b l ,b  2) <_ f (u ,b l ,b  2) " f (v ,a l ,a2) ;  
hence g(u, v, a) <_ g(u, v, b). Analogous ly ,  for u < v and  a >_ b we have 
g(u, v, a) <_ g(u, v, b). There fore  we get the min imum of g for a suitable 
a ~ {a l ,a2} .  
Secondly,  we show 
min  g(u, v,  a )  = min ~(~,¥ ,  a) .  
(u,v,a)~u×v×{a>a 2} a~{al,a 2} 
For  an a ~ {a 1, a 2} and <)a = (a 1, a2), let (c 1, C 2) = (/(~, al, a2) ,
f(P, a 1, a2)) and  (d l ,  d2) = ( f (u ,  as, a2), f (v ,  a 1, a2)). Because of the mono-  
tonicity of f [cf. Lemma 3.2(a)] and  the def in i t ion of f, we have c 1 _< d l 
and  c 2 >_ d2; hence ~(~,¥,  a) = c 1 :c  2 _ d 1 :d  2 =g(u ,v ,a ) .  
Robustness of BBNs 51 
Analogously,  we get the maximum of g. 
(d): Fol lows from the continuity of f and the definit ion of  the opera-  
tor ~ .  • 
[.EMMA 3.7 (Propagat ion of l ikel ihoods) Let ~9~ = {A ~ B, B ~ q - C, 
U 
(A ,  B, C), ( A,  B, C)} and c = g(u, v, a). Then 
,9~ ~ A ~ C - C. 
precise 
U 
Proof  Since A ~ B is c-restricted, we have (u, v, a) ~ Dg. Let ~a  = 
l '  
(al, a2). 
1. Consequence: Let J be a model  for 2 .  Let x = P(C IB)  and 
y =P(C IB) .  Then P(C IA)  =f (u ,x ,y )  and P(C IA)  =f (v ,x ,y ) ;  
cf. Lemma 3.3. Since x : y = P(C I B) : P(C I B) = a 1 : a 2, we get by 
Lemma 3.6(b) f (u,  x, y) : f (v ,  x, y) =f (u ,a  1,a 2 ) : f (v ,a  l , a  2) = 
g(u, v, a) = c, i.e., J satisfies A ~ f - C. 
2. Precision: I f  a = 1, then let (x, y)  = (.5, .5); otherwise, let (x, y)  = 
U X 
(a 1, a2). Then there is a Bayesian model  ~ for {A ~ B, B ~ C}, and 
c y 
this J is a model  for JT. • 
THEOREM 3.8 [Propagat ion of l ikel ihood bounds (PL)] Let ~ = 
U 
{A ~ B, B ~a-  C, (A ,B ,C) ,  (A ,B ,C>} and c =g(u ,v ,a ) .  Then 
W 
3 ~ A~c-C .  
precise 
ILl 
Proof  Since A ~ B is c-restricted, we have (u,v, a) ~ Dg. 
V 
1. Consequence: Let J be a model  for ~2'. Let u = P(B IA)~ u, 
v =P(B IX)  ~v,  and a =P(C IB) :P (C IB)~ a. F rom Lemma 
3.7 and Lemma 3.6(c) we get P(C IA) :P (C IA)=g(u ,v ,a )  
g(u, v, a) = c, i.e. J satisfies A ,-- ~ - C. 
2. Precision: Let c ~ c. Since g is cont inuous [cf. Lemma 3.6(d)], there 
are u ~u,  v ~v ,  and a ~a such that c =g(u ,v ,a ) .  Lemma 3.7 
t t  
implies that there is a model  for {A ~B,  B ,---a- C, (A ,B ,C) ,  
<A,~,C>, A ,-- ~-  C}. ' • 
Theorem 3.8 allows us to propagate the influence of an evidence 
C on a node B to a node A which is the parent  of B in the causal tree 
(backward propagation). For  the purpose of  deriving l ikel ihood informa- 
tion, we can assume the rule A ~-- - : -  A for each evidence A in g'. 
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This does not change the probabi l ist ic semantics of  ~ ,  since we have 
P(A IA):P(A IX )= 1"0 = ~. 
In our running Example 2.7, we use Headache  , - - -7-  Headache ,  and 
then we propagate  the l ikel ihood informat ion in the backward direction: 
.80 .90 <---- 
Tumor  > , Headache ,  Headache  . -  Headache  
.50 .60 
1.3 1.8 
~- Tumor  ~ - -  Headache  
PL 
.20 .30 1.3 1.8 
Cancer  ) ) Tumor ,  Tumor  ( : - -  Headache  
.01 .10 
1.0 1.2 
t-- Cancer  *~ - -  Headache  
PL  
The l i ke l ihood  ra t io  P (Headache  I Tumor) :P (Headache  I ~Tumor)  is 
between 80 : 60 = 1.3 and  90 : 50 = 1.8, and  
P (Headache l  Cancer ) 'P (Headache l  ~Cancer )  
is between 1.0 and  1.2 ( rounded resul ts) .  
I1 X 
Given ~ '= {A ~B,B~C,(A ,B ,C) , (A ,B ,C)} ,  the reader  may 
v y 
think about alternative ways of deriving A ,--- 9 - C: For  instance, we can 
derive A z > C and X ' * ,  C by applying Theorem 3.4. Af ter  combining 
z 
both rules to A~C and using C~7-  C, Theorem 3.8 might yield a 
w 
precise result. However,  this is not true in general .  
In Example 2.7, we get Cancer  .56.69> Headache and 
.50 .63 
Cancer  > Headache ,  
and according to the suggested procedure,  we get 
.89 1.4 
Cancer  *---- : - -  Headache ,  
which is not precise. 
To explain the prob lem consider the diagram in F igure 1: Al l  possible 
combinat ions for z ~ z and w ~ w are depicted there. Theorem 3.8 exactly 
7/3 
1o2 = .63- 
wl = .50. 
l 
zl = .56 z2 = .69 z 
Figure 1. Admissible region for derived probabilities. 
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determines the lower and upper  l ikelihood bounds for z :w within the 
given region. But if we incorrectly consider the full rectangle with the 
points (z~,w 2) and (z2,w~), not surprisingly we get l ikelihood bounds (as 
e.g. [.56 : .63, .69 :.50] = [.89, 1.4]), which are not precise. 
3.3. Fusion of Probabil it ies and Likel ihoods 
Finally we describe how causal and diagnostic evidence are combined 
properly. 
DEFINITION 3.9 (Functions h and h) Let t~ = (0, ~) and t 2 = (1, 0). Let 
D h : (U >(Q)  \ {tl, t 2} and h : O h ~ Q; let 
D h = {(u ,a )  ~ U × Q I (u l ,a2)  =~ tl, (ue ,a  1) =~ t 2} 
and h : D h --* Q. 
• h(u,  a) := u.  a l / f (u ,  a 1, a2), where <ha = (al, a2) ,
• h(u, a) := [h(u 1, al), h(ue, a2)]. 
For (u, a) ~ U × Q and ~a = (a 1, a2), we conclude from Lemma 3.2(c) 
that f (u ,  a 1, a 2) = 0 iff (u, a) ~ {t 1, t2}. Therefore,  the function h is not 
defined for the tuples t 1 and t e. The constraints for the definition of h are 
analogous. 
LEMMA 3.10 (Propert ies of h and h) 
(a) Letu  ~ Uanda l :a  2 =b l :b  2. I f f (u ,  a l ,a  2)> 0 then 
f (u ,b  1,b e ) >0 and 
u .a I u .b  1 
f (u ,a l ,a  2) f (U ,  b l ,b2)  " 
(b) h(u,a)  = [min(u,a)~ u×a h(u, a),max(u,a)~ u× a h(u, a)]. 
(c) h is continuous. 
Proof  Follows f rom the propert ies of f ;  cf. Lemma 3.2. 
LEMMA 3.11 (Fusion of exact probabil it ies and likelihoods) Let  ~9~ = 
{A u >B,B~q-  C , (A ,B ,C) , (A ,B ,C)}  with (u ,a )~D h andz= 
h(u,  a). Then 
~ AC z >B. 
precise 
Proof  Let ©a = (al,  a2). 
1. Consequence: Let J be a model  for ~' .  Let x = P(C IB)  and 
y = P (C IB) .  Then P(BC IA)  = u -x  and P(C  IA)  =f(u ,x ,y ) ;  cf. 
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the proof  of  Lemma 3.3. Since x • y = P(C  I B)" P (C  I B)  = al " a 2, 
we get by Lemma 3.10(a) 
P(B  I AC)  - 
P (BC IA)  u "x u "a~ 
P(C  IA )  f (u ,  x, y) f (u ,  az,a 2) 
= h(u ,a )  = z. 
[Note that because (u, a) ~ D h, we have f (u ,  a 1, a 2) > 0, and hence 
P(AC)  > 0.] That is, J satisfies AC z , B. 
2. Precision: Obvious. 
THEOREM 3.12 [Fusion of  probability and likelihood bounds (FPL)] Let 
,9~={A U)B,B~a-  C , (A ,B ,C) , (A ,B ,C)}wi th (u ,a )~Dhand 
z = h(u, a). Then 
~ AC Z)B .  
precise 
Proof  Follows from Lemma 3.11 and Lemma 3.10(b), (c). • 
Theorem 3.12 allows us to fuse the influence of a causal evidence A on 
a node B with the influence of a diagnostic evidence C on B, and we get 
the belief in B. The condition (u, a) ~ D h is necessary and sufficient to 
guarantee P(AC)  > 0 for all models of ~,~. In cases where P(AC)  may 
become 0, P(B IAC)  is not defined; hence no belief in B can be com- 
puted. This problem may even occur in Bayesian networks with point 
probabilities. It can be circumvented by disallowing the extreme probabili- 
ties 0 and 1. 
Let us apply Theorem 3.12 to Example 2.7. Knowing that a patient has 
severe headaches, we are interested in the belief that he has a brain tumor 
or a metastatic ancer: 
f~ .05 .15> Tumor, Tumor ~ : 1..~s 
.20 .25  Cancer, Cancer ~ : 1.2 
Headache 
.06 .24 
I- Headache ) Tumor 
FPL 
Headache 
I- Headache .21 29 Cancer 
FPL 
The belief in a brain tumor lies between 6% and 24%, while the belief in a 
metastatic ancer is in the range from 21% to 29%. Compared to the 
situation before knowing the severe headaches, i.e. f~ .05 .15 Tumor  and 
f~ .20.25 Cancer ,  the above beliefs have increased, but there is not 
enough evidence that the patient has the tumor or the cancer. 
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The propagation of the influence of an evidence through a tree is very 
similar to that through a chain. Probability bounds are propagated from 
each node to its children, and likelihood bounds are propagated from each 
node to its parent. 
LEMMA 3.13 (Fusion of likelihoods) Let Dp = Q2 \ {(0, oo),(~, 0)}. Let 
~={Be.  a -  A, Be  -b -  C, (A ,B,C>,  (A,B,C>} with (a,b) EDp. 
Then 
a'b 
~ B ~- : -AC.  
precise 
Proof Left to the reader. • 
THEOREM 3.14 [Fusion of likelihood bounds (FLL)] Let Dp = {(a, b) 
Q2 I (a l ,b  2) 4: (0, ~), (a2,b 1) 4: (w, 0)}. Let 
5~'= [Be .  a -  A,B~ - -b -  C , (A ,B ,C) , (A ,B ,C)}  
with (a,b) ~ Dp and a • b := [a 1 • b l ,a  2 • b2]. Then 
a-b 
~ B ~- : -AC.  
precise 
Proof Follows from Lemma 3.13 and the monotonicity and continuity 
of "." • 
The effect of two diagnostic evidences A and C on a node B is fused by 
simply multiplying the corresponding likelihood bounds. Even in the case 
where a node has more than two children, the resulting likelihood bounds 
are a product of the given bounds. This follows directly from the fact that, 
for a given node B, two disjoint subsets of children of B are conditionally 
independent. 
4. SOUNDNESS, COMPLETENESS AND EFFICIENCY 
Now we present the derivation of answers to a query based on the 
inference rules given in the previous ection. We show that these inference 
rules are sound and complete for causal trees. (The extension to polytrees 
will be treated in Section 6.) 
4.1. Soundness and Completeness Theorem 
For the purpose of computing an answer--with implicit independence 
assumptions--we introduce the following rules. 
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DEFINITION 4.1 @r-Rule and A-rule) Let B be a basic predicate, and A,  C 
be conjunctive predicates. Let u ~ U and a ~ Q. 
• A >c B is called a ~--rule. 
• B c*-- ~ - A is called a A-rule. 
Let J be a probabilistic interpretation. 
• ~A >cB~j i f f  ~A u ,B~jand[ (A ,C ,B>] j .  
a 
• [EBc~: -  A}~ iff ~B ,___a_ A I~ and [r(B,C,A)}I j .  
Let a be a 7r-rule or A-rule of the given form. h a := B, b, := C and t~ := A 
are called the head, boundary, and tail of a, respectively. 
The boundary is useful for directing the propagation and fusion of 
bounds in a causal derivation. 
NOTATION A m B holds if the set of basic predicates from A and the set of 
basic predicates from B are disjoint. 
DEFINITION 4.2 (Causal derivation) Let ~ be a causal program w.r.t, a 
causal tree. Let ~ be a query with a set ~ of evidences. A causal 
derivation w.r.t. (~ ,  ~)  is a sequence of 7r- and A-rules generated from 
and ~ by applying the following inference rules: 
• Initialization: 
z z 
>B~f~ >riB,  
I P  
zc 
B~-BB*- - - : -  B. 
I L  
• Propagation of probability and likelihood bounds: 
x 
A u z >DB, B -~C,  C77D,  z=f (u ,x ,y )~-A  >B C, 
y PP  
u 
: _ c 
A- -~B,  BD~ --a C ,A  mD,  c=g(u ,v ,a )  F -AB~ : -  C. 
v PL  
• Fusion of probability and likelihood bounds: 
A u a > DB,  BE* - : -  C, D77E, (u ,a )~Dh,  
z = h(u ,a )  ~- AC 
FPL  
a b 
BD*--: -- A ,  BE*-- : - C, 
> DE B, 
D mE, (a ,b )  ~Dp,  
e 
c = a .  b F- BDE~: - -  AC.  
FLL  
In general, given a causal derivation, the boundary consists of parents 
and children of the head. (In some special cases, the head occurs in the 
boundary.) The boundary allows us to keep track of the influences on the 
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head, so that an evidence is not counted twice and so that an influence is 
not fed back to its origin: Given a rule a,  the joint influence of the 
evidences from t~ on the head h a is propagated only to those parents and 
children of h,~ which are outside b~; this prevents the feedback of 
influences. On the other hand, two rules are fusioned if their boundaries 
are disjoint; this prevents us from counting evidences twice. 
DEFINITION 4.3 (Computed answer of a query) Let  9 be a causal 
program w.r.t, a causal tree, and let ~ = A > B. We say A z > B is a 
computed answer w.r.t. ( ~ ,  ~ ) i f  there is a causal derivation w.r.t. (9 ,  ~ ) g 
such that the last rule in the sequence is A > c B for  some C. 
Some examples for causal derivations have already been given in Section 
3. (Subscribed predicates were omitted there, but they could easily be 
provided.) 
Let us consider the situation at node C in Figure 2. We have an 
influence of a causal evidence A on C, and influences of two diagnostic 
evidences E and G on C. 
A " >BC, CD~- : - -E ,  and CF~: - -G  are assumed to be precise 
Bayesian consequences of the given tree ~.  By applying the methods for 
fusion and propagation, we get again precise Bayesian consequences of ~.  
• Fusion of probability and likelihood bounds: 
A >BC, CD~- - : - -E  ~- AE  >BD C, 
FPL  
A >BC,  CF~: - -G I - -AG >BF C, 
FPL  
CD~- -  : - -  E ,  CF~- -  : - G t -  CDF  ~-  : - -  EG,  
FLL 
A >BC, CDF ~--: - -EG F- AEG >BDF C. 
FPL  
) . . . . .  [ ]  
cF ÷.- a kf_ j --- 
Figure 2. Computation of precise Bayesian consequences in a causal tree. 
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• Propagation of probability and likelihood bounds: 
AE > Bc  C ,  C > > F ~- AE  > c F,  
PP 
AG > BF C ,  C > > D t- AG > c D,  
• . pp 
B > ) C ,CDF ~'" : - -  EG ~- Bc~-  : - EG.  
• " PL 
This leads us to the following theorem. 
THEOREM 4.4 (Soundness and completeness of causal derivations) Let 
be a causal program w.r.t, a causal tree, and let ~ = A > B. Then 
every computed answer w.r.t. (~ ,  ~)  is precise Bayesian, and every precise 
Bayesian answer w.r.t. (~ ,  ~)  can be computed. 
Proof (sketch) 
1. Soundness: Every computed answer is precise Bayesian. 
• Consequence: Let S be a Bayesian model for ~ .  Obviously, J 
satisfies every rule derived by IP or IL. The independence rules 
in a causal graph and Theorem 3.4, 3.8, 3.12, and 3.14 imply that 
each application of PP, PL, FPL, and FLL, respectively, ields a 
Bayesian consequence of ~.  
• Precision: Let A > B be a derived rule with an interval z, 
and let z ~ z. It can be shown that there is a Bayesian model for 
and the specialization A z > B (cf. [28]). 
2. Completeness: Every precise Bayesian answer can be computed. 
Let A > B be a precise Bayesian answer. Then it can be shown 
Z 
that there is a derivation of a rule c~ = A > c B, where C consists of 
all parents of B and the minimal set of children of B such that A and B 
are separated by C (cf. [28]). Consequently, the computed bounds for 
are precise. • 
4.2. Efficiency of Bounds Propagation 
Finally, let us consider the complexity of computing an answer to a 
query: Let m be the number of evidences, and let n be the number of 
vertices in a causal graph. 
The effort to fuse m evidences is linear in m, and the effort to 
propagate an evidence through the graph is linear in n. Therefore, the 
computational effort of computing an answer is O(m + n). More precisely, 
since m < n, the complexity is O(n).  
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5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
As already mentioned in the introduction, one of the reasons to study 
intervals of probabilities instead of point probabilities is the need for 
sensitivity analysis. Therefore, now we want to analyze the extent to which 
imprecisions in the input probabilities affect the derived conclusions. To 
measure this effect, let us consider a Bayesian network with point proba- 
bilities and a corresponding causal program with probability intervals of 
various degrees of imprecision. 
EXAMPLE 5.1 (Sunburn) [17] Suppose it is Saturday and you work in a 
windowless office. You look forward to going to a baseball game later. If it 
rains, there is a 95% chance that the game will be canceled, and otherwise 
it is certain that the game will be played. You assume that it is cloudy 10% 
of the time. Clouds cause rain 60% of the time, and rain cannot occur if 
clouds are absent. 
Question 1: Will the game be rained out? 
Now suppose a somewhat unreliable rain alarm sounds in your office 
and you wish to determine a revised probability of rain. Experience with 
the alarm tells your that the probability of the alarm sounding when there 
is rain is 0.8, but 4% of the time the alarm will sound falsely. 
Question 2: How are the chances for the game now? 
Later that afternoon your son calls you on the telephone. He is reluctant 
to discuss the weather, but insists on spending the night with his nearby 
aunt. After consenting, you muse over the conversation, remembering that 
he tends to visit her only when he has something to hide. You know that 
he is at the local beach. If it is sunny (not cloudy), it is 70% probable he 
will get a sunburn, but if it is cloudy, there is only a 10% chance that he 
will get a sunburn. You estimate that he would certainly visit his aunt if 
he is sunburned, while the probability that he would visit here otherwise is 
only 2%. 
Question 3: How does this new event affect the ball game? 
According to [17], the following results can be derived in a Bayesian 
network: The answer to Question 1 is that the game will be played with a 
belief of 94%. In the situation of Question 2, the chances for the game are 
reduced to a belief of 47%. The answer to Question 3 is that the game 
becomes more probable again with a belief of 83%. 
Instead of deriving the same results, we want to analyze the sensitivity of 
the above conclusions when the input is not exact. We assume that each 
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probability has an imprecision of +2%. (This is an absolute imprecision. 
The sensitivity can also be measured by a relative imprecision. A scenario 
with different imprecisions will be given at the end of this section.) Cases 
with an extreme probability of 0 or of 1 are naturally interpreted as 
taxonomic knowledge (cf. [10]). Considering impreeisions (called blurring 
subsequently) would model exceptions to a generic taxonomical rule (cf. 
[19]). The full scenario is depicted in Figure 3. 
? 
Question 1: ~ > G: 
12 .08 .12> C }- ~ .08 .12> fl C, 
iP 
.08 .12 .58 .62 .05 .09 
12 ) f lC ,  C ) ) R t -~ > c R,  
0 .02 PP 
.05 .09 .03 .07 .89 .96 
12 >cR,  R ) ) G~-12 >RG. 
.98 I PP 
In absence of any evidence, only the influence of the background knowl- 
edge 12 is propagated to node G. The belief is very high that the baseball 
game will be played: it is between 89% and 96%. For the given impreci- 
sion, this result is relatively insensitive. 
? 
Question 2: A ) G: 
A ~[ - -A  A "~---~- A ,  
IL 
.78 .82 (..._ ~ 13 41 
R ) )A ,A  A . -  Ab-RA~' - ' - : - -A ,  
.02 .05 PL 
12 .05 .09 ~ 41 .39 .Sl 
> cR,  RA : - -A  ]-- A > AC R,  
FPL 
.39 .81 .03 .07 .21 .64 
A >AcR,  R ) ) Gb-A  >RG. 
.98 l PP 
=clouds 
~ ~_----sunburn 
Program: 
.08 .12 - 
f~'°8 "1} C, C "~ .o2 C .~  ,~', 
.78 .82 . 
R .o--~.o6 A , R "°3-~ G, S ~ p. .98 1 0.04 
Queries: 
? ? ? 
~:+G,  A :+G,  AP-:-~-G. 
Figure 3. Causal tree, program, and queries for the sunburn example. 
Robustness of BBNs 61 
Upon receipt of the evidence A, the chances for the game are reduced: 
they are now between 21% and 64%. Obviously, the situation is highly 
sensitive; the bounds tend to diffuse, which means that the results of the 
point probability analysis should be taken with a grain of salt. 
.9 
Question 3: AP ) G: 
P ~ 8 ~-  pp~-- -7-  P ,  
IL 
.98 1 ~ 25 
S ) )P ,  Pp~"- : -  P~-Se~- - - : - -P ,  
0 .04 PL 
.08 .12 ~ ~ .11 .22 
C ~)S ,  Sp  : - -P t -Cs (  : - -P ,  
.68 .72 PL 
.08 .12 .11 .22 .01 .03 
l~ ) aC ,  Cs  ( : P F- P ) s C, 
FPL 
.01 .037 S ~/'~, C .58) .62) RF_p  .01 .04) cR ,  P 
0 .02 PP 
p .01 .04) ~ 41 .07.62 
cR,  RA : - -A  ~- AP  )AC R ,  
FPL 
.07 .62 .03 .07 .39 .94 
AP )AcR,  R ) , Gt -AP  )R G. 
.98 1 PP 
The second revision takes into account he influences of A and P on G. 
The new belief is between 39% and 94%. Thus in general it is higher than 
the previous one. This belief revision reveals a very high sensitivity as 
indicated by wide bounds. 
The deductions here did not employ method FLL. The point is that this 
method is only required when several diagnostic supports arrive at a node. 
For instance, consider the belief that there are clouds under the evidences 
A and P: 
? 
Question: AP ) C: 
.58 .62 13 41 (6.4 26 
C ) ) R ,  RA+- - : - -A I ' - -C t¢  : - -A ,  
0 .02 PL 
C R 6~__ : ~26 A ,  C s l~ - -1 : __'22 p ~- C RS (.71 : __5"S AP,  
FLL 
~-~ .08 .12 CR S (.71 5.8 ) ) a C~ : - -  AP  F- AP  .06 .44 RS C. 
FPL 
The belief in the presence of clouds is between 6% and 44%. The reason 
for the wide bounds is again the existence of opposing evidences A and P. 
(Again the point probability analysis yields a very precise answer, namely 
19%, but of limited trustworthiness.) The rain alarm is an explanation for 
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Table 1. Sensitivity Analysis with Different Levels of Imprecision 
Imprecision +0% + 1% + 1% +2% +2% 
Blurring No No Yes No Yes 
? 
f~ , G .94 .94 .94 .95 .92 .95 .93 .96 .89 .96 
? 
A > G .47 .47 .37 .56 .33 .56 .26 .64 .21 .64 
? 
AP > G .83 .83 .73 .89 .61 .89 .58 .94 .39 .94 
? 
AP > C .19 .19 .12 .29 .10 .29 .07 .44 .06 .44 
the presence of clouds, whereas the phone call of the probably sunburned 
son is an explanation for the absence of clouds. The belief in the absence 
of clouds is preferred, since the effect of the sunburn evidence is greater 
than that of the somewhat unreliable rain alarm. 
Table 1 shows the results for Example 5.1 in dependence of an absolute 
imprecision and the blurring of extreme probabilities. The computation of 
the bounds in the last column was discussed above. We can observe several 
widening bounds, even if we choose an imprecision of _+1% and without 
blurring the extreme probabilities 0 and 1. Thus in the light of opposing 
evidences ome bounds tend to diffuse toward the unit interval because of 
an increased sensitivity. 
In fact, such behavior might turn into a killer argument against he use 
of Bayesian networks for decision analysis in general. Employing our 
approach with a sound, complete, and efficient inference method for 
probability intervals can now come as a remedy. A sensitivity analysis as 
demonstrated above can detect such undesirable behavior. By a systematic 
investigation we can identify those sensitive portions of the network that 
are prone to chaotic behavior. This knowledge can then be taken as an 
educated guess, where one might wish to change or refine to chosen 
network. Eventually, after some iterations of this scenario, the network 
design should become much more robust and reliable for decision-analysis 
applications (e.g. influence diagrams) implemented on top of it. 
6. BOUNDS PROPAGATION IN POLYTREES 
We extend the previous result for causal trees to polytrees where each 
node may have at most two parents and thus multiple roots may occur. 
6.1. Propagation of Probabil i t ies 
Compared to causal trees, polytrees offer the possibility to model 
multiple causes for an event. For instance, E may be caused by B or D or 
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both. To describe the interaction among the causes, when we are con- 
cerned with uncertain and incomplete information, we use the causal rule 
with two causes: 
B.D~E.  
This rule describes the joint effect of two causes, B and D, on an event E 
and their interactions. For instance, B may weakly support E, but BD can 
be a strong support for E - - then  the bounds of s are less than the bounds 
of r; in particular s 2 < r r Extreme probabilities uch as 0 and 1 are 
allowed; see the range restrictions in Definition 2.2. We may even imagine 
a logical circuit represented by a set of causal rules. Then, our methods 
can not only determine the functional result of the circuit but also be 
applied for a fault diagnosis in case of a malfunction, involving forward 
and backward inference. 
Since we have multiple causes, there are multiple roots and multiple 
causal influences on an event: Each root depends on a priori (background) 
knowledge which involves a causal influence. 
DEFINITION 6.1 (Functions k and k) Let k : U 6 --> U and k : U 2 × 
U s -o Uand k :U  6 --o U, 
k(u,  v, r, s, x, y) := f (u ,  f (v ,  r, s), f (v ,  x, y)) ,  
fc(a, v, r, s, x, y) := f (a , f (v ,  r, s ) , f (v ,  x, y)) ,  
k(u,v,  r, s ,x ,y)  
:= [ min 
v ~ (vl, v~} 
LEMMA 6.2 (Propagation of exact probabilities) Let 
k(u '  w' r l '  s l '  x l ' y l ) '  v ~maX~v,, v2~]~ (u' v'  r2'  s2' x 2' Y2)]" 
~q~= A u >B,C v >D,B .D~E, (AC,  BD, E) ,  
(AC ,  BD, E) ,  (AC ,  BD, E) ,  (AC,  BD,  E) ,  
(B,  AC,  D) ,  (B ,A ,C) ,  (D ,C ,A) ,  (A , I~ ,C)  
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and z = k(u, v, r, s, x, y). Then 
~9~ ~ A C z > E. 
precise 
Proof See [28]. 
THEOREM 6.3 [Propagation of probability bounds (PP2)] Let 
,9~= A U>B,C v >D,B .D~E, (AC,  BD, E),  
(AC,  BD, E>, (AC,  BD, E),  <AC, BD, E>, 
(B, AC, D),  (B, A ,C) ,  (D,C,  A) ,  (A ,  11,C)} 
and z = k(u, v, r, s, x, y). Then 
~' ~ AC z > E. 
precise 
Proof Follows from I_emma 6.2 and the properties of k and k. • 
Theorem 6.3 allows us to propagate the influences of A on B and C on 
D to E, which is the child of B and D in the causal graph. This 
propagation becomes more complex if we have more then two direct 
causes of E. I f  the number of direct causes is n, we would require a causal 
rule with 2 n entries of bounds, so the computational complexity becomes 
exponential, too. Bayesian networks with point probabilities have the same 
problem. There it is suggested to categorize the interaction among clusters 
into prototypical structures, e.g. the so-called noisy OR gates and noisy AND 
gates, if additional assumptions like accountability or exception indepen- 
dence [18] can be made. The generalization of noisy OR gates and noisy 
AND gates to cope with intervals is similar to the above studies and is 
therefore omitted here. Thus we only show the bounds propagation through 
a causal graph where an event has at most two causes. (An illustrating 
example will be given later on in Section 6.4.) 
6.2. Propagation of Likelihoods 
To propagate the influence of a diagnostic evidence through the branches 
of a polytree in the backward irection, we need an additional propagation 
method for likelihoods. 
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DEFINITION 6.4 (Functions l and I) Let D t = {(u, r, s, x, y, a) E U 5 x 
Q I ( f (v ,  r, s), f (v ,  x, y), a) ~ Dg} and l : D r -~ Q; let 
D I = {(v , r , s ,x ,y ,a )  ~ U 5 × Q I (f(v, r, s), f(v, x, y), a) ~ Dg} 
and I :D  1 -~ Q. 
• /(v, r, s, x, y, a) := g( f (v ,  r, s), f (v ,  x, y), a). 
• l(c, a,  fl, y, 6, a) := / (v ,  ai, fli, Yi, 6i, a), where i = 1 if a > 1, and 
otherwise i = 2, for a, fl, y, 6 ~ U 2. 
• I(v, r, s, x,y, a) 
• - ^ . . . .  /(v, r, s, x, ~', a)], [min~,.. a) ~ L l(v, r, s, x, y, a), max~, a) E L 
where L = {vl, v 2} )< {al, a2}. 
The constraints for l and ! are derived from the constraints for g and g. 
LEMMA 6.5 (Propagation of likelihoods) Let 
• ~= C ~' ,D ,B .D-~E,E* - - '~-  F , (BCD,  E ,F ) ,  
(BCD, ff~, F) ,  (C, BD, E) ,  (C, BD, E) ,  (CD, f~, B)}  
I 
with (v, r, s, x, y, a) ~ Dr, and let c = l(v, r, s, x, y, a). Then 
~" ~ B~-  CF. 
precise 
Proof  See [28]. • 
THEOREM 6.6 [Propagation of likelihood bounds (PL2)] Let 
~.a~= C ~ ,D ,B .D- - *E ,E~a-  F , (BCD,  E ,F ) ,  
(BCD, ff~, F ) ,  (C, BD, E) ,  (C, BD, E) ,  (CD, n ,  B)  } 
¢ 
with (v, r, s, x, y, a) ~ D l, and let c = l(v, r, s, x, y, a). Then 
~ B~ c -  CF. 
precise 
Proof  Follows from Lemma 6.5 and the properties of l and i. • 
If on the one hand we know the influence of the causal evidence C on 
D which is a potential cause for E, and on the other hand the influence of 
66 H. Th6ne, U. Giintzer, and W. Kiel31ing 
the diagnostic evidence F on E, then we can combine them properly and 
propagate their support o B which is another cause of E. 
REMARK 1 The fusion of probabilities and likelihoods can be done by the 
same method as in trees (see Theorem 3.12). 
REMARK 2 PL2 can also be applied in the following special cases: 
(a) Given 
C v ,D ,  D .B~E,  E~9-  F 
and suitable independence rules, we can derive B ~ c - CF after 
we convert 
D.B-*  E into B.D-*  E. 
(b) Given 
r 
C v ~D, B .D-*E  
and suitable independence rules, we can derive B ~ ~-  C after 
1 
assuming E~: -  fi (since l(v, r, s, x, y, [1,1]) = [1,1]). This does 
not change the semantics of a program, because P( I )  I E)  : P(f~ J E)  
=1:1=1.  
6.3. Soundness, Completeness, and Efficiency 
Bounds propagation for causal programs w.r.t, a causal polytree can use 
all causal derivation rules as stated in Definition 4.2. In addition the 
following derivation rules are required. 
DEFINITION 6.7 (Causal derivation for polytrees) 
• Initialization: 
D .B~E~-B.D~E.  
s S 
y 
• Propagation of  likelihood bounds: 
U V 
(a) A ,FB ,  C ~D,B .D.~E,E~FG,  z=k(u ,v , r , s ,x ,y )  
~- AC z ~BoE. 
PP2 
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(b) C v >cD, B .D~E,  E14~ a -  F, E~G,  (v , r , s ,x ,y ,a )~ 
Di, c --- i (v,r,s,x,y,a) t- B E ~ ~-  CF. 
PL2 
1 
(c) C v >cD, B .D~E,  ENG,  C ~  F- BE* - - : -  C. 
PL2' 
We derive c-rules by inference rules IP, FPL, PP, and PP2, while 
A-rules are derived by IL, FLL, PL, PL2, and PL2'. Inference rule S 
symmetrizes a causal rule with two causes, and PL2' is a specialization of 
PL2. 
THEOREM 6.8 (Soundness and completeness for polytrees) Let ~? be a 
causal program w.r.t, a causal polytree of indegree 2, and let ~ = A > B. 
Then every computed answer w.r.t. ( ~ ,  d ~) is precise Bayesian, and every 
precise Bayesian answer w.r.t. (~ ,  d ~) can be computed. 
The proof of Theorem 6.8 is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.4. 
Concerning efficient query answering the same results as for causal trees 
apply; i.e., query answering for polytrees is of linear complexity, too. 
6.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
In addition to the phenomena in Example 5.1 let us study an example 
for the interaction of multiple causes and the application of PP2 and PL2, 
with special emphasis on sensitivity phenomena. 
EXAMPLE 6.9 (Burglary; cf. [18]) Imagine Mr. Holmes receives a phone 
call at work from his neighbor Dr. Watson, who states that he hears an 
alarm from the direction of Mr. Holme's house. Mr. Holmes assumes that 
a burglary is the cause of the alarm. As he is preparing to leave his office, 
he recalls that his daughter is scheduled to arrive home any minute. If 
greeted by an alarm sound, she probably would phone him for instructions. 
After waiting some minutes he decides to rush home. In his car he turns 
2 Note that it is not necessary ~ describe all dependencies by causal rules. Likelihood rules 
can be used as well, as e.g. A g-:-- : v_ W, which says that the likelihood of the alarm--com- 
ing from Mr. Holmes' house--is between 50 : 1 and 60 : 1. Then we have virtual evidence for 
the alarm. 
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on his radio and hears the news that an earthquake has occurred. Mr. 
Holmes remembers reading in the instruction manual of his alarm system 
that the device is sensitive to earthquakes and can be accidentally trig- 
gered by one. So he reduces his initial belief in the burglary hypothesis, 
since the earthquake xplains away the burglary as a cause for the alarm. 
A specification of this story is depicted in Figure 4. Note that this time 
we start out with intervals instead of exact probabilities. Dr. Watson's 
testimony seems to be very reliable, but it is not absolutely certain that the 
alarm comes from Mr. Holme's house. So we try to estimate this informa- 
tion by the rule A .5o.60 W" 2 The house is supposed to be in an environ- 
.01 .01 
ment where earthquakes can be expected, e.g. in California. Further, we 
assume that there are two or three earthquakes within a decade, that is, 
the odds for an earthquake are between 26 and 36 (6 = 1/(365 x 10)) on 
a particular day. According to the crime statistics, a burglary is attempted 
only once or twice within a decade. The alarm system is judged to be very 
safe: An alarm is triggered by a burglary in more than 95% of all cases, but 
not always. A false alarm is produced at least once within three years, so 
we assume that the chances are between 0.1% and 0.2%. An earthquake 
.70 .80 .40 .50 
causes an alarm in 5% to 10%. The other rules, A > > D and E ~ , R, 
0 .01 .001 .002 
have the usual form of a causal rule and should be self-explanatory. 
At this point, we add a remark about the independence assumptions. 
The earthquake and burglary hypothesis are unconditionally independent. 
However, knowledge about the alarm status, e.g. Watson's testimony, 
induces a dependency between these hypothesis. If we know that the alarm 
has occurred to a certain extent, the evidence for one hypothesis is an 
indirect evidence against he other (explaining away). 
There are two evidences: Dr. Watson's testimony and the radio report 
with the earthquake announcement. First, we consider the situation imme- 
~art  hq?~burglary 
@----report i Wat~so'n~ ~daught er 
Program: 
.70.80 _ f/263~E, E ~ R, A~D,  .001 .002 .96 .99 
~21~ 2~ B, B .E  ~ A, A 5-~°:6° W. .05.10 .001 .002 
Queries: 
? 7 
W -~ B , W -:-,- E , 
? ? 
RW-:- , -B,  RW~, -E .  
? 
W-A~- D, 
Figure 4. Causal polytree, program, and queries for the burglary example. 
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diately after Dr. Watson's phone call. (Subscribed predicates are omitted 
here.) 
? 
Query 1: W , B: 
~-~ 26 36 E, B.E  
~,~ 16 26 B, E.B  
A 
.01 .01 
.95 .98 
.96 .99 50 
) 7 A ,A~- - - -  
.05 .10 
.001 .002 
.96 .99 
.05 .10 50 
) 7 A ,A~- - -  
.95 .98 
.001 .002 
43 ~.~ 16 26  B,  B ~- -  
W~-W~--7 -  W, 
IL 
.50 .60 
, , W,W, - -~?-  
50 60 
W~-A ~--- : - - tW,  
PL 
60 W ~_ B J~2_3 55 W, 
PL2 
6.__.O0 W I-- E 3.1 : 6.._.~.4 W,  
PL2 
5_~_5 W b- W .o12 .030 B .  
FPL 
? 
Query 2: W , E: 
~-~ 26 367 E,  E (3.1 : 6.4- W J-- W .002 .0057 E .  
FPL 
A burglary is more probable than an earthquake, since the bounds of 
[.012,.030] are greater than those of [.002, .005]. So the burglary is a 
potential explanation for the alarm. However, the belief is still very low. 
This is not unexpected, given the testimony of Dr. Watson and the high 
false-alarm rate. 
Now let us predict the event that the daughter will call: 
? 
Query 3: W , D: 
~.~ 26 36 E,  f~ 
11 
.96 .99 
16 26 B, B.E  .95 .98 .001 .003 ' '  A~I '~  A ,  
.05 .10 PP2 
.001 .002 
50 60 .06 .14 .001 .003> A,  A ~ : - -  W I--- W A ,  
FPL 
W .06 .14> A, A .70 .80 .04 .12 
) ,D~-W D.  
0 .01 PP 
The chances are between 4% and 12%. This is not surprising either. If 
there is no alarm, Mr. Holmes's daughter calls him less than once in 100 
days. An alarm increases the chances of her call, but the alarm is not 
certain here. 
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So far we have considered only one evidence, Dr. Watson's call. After 
the radio report the situation at hand is different. 
? 
Query 4: RW > B: 
R~t -R~- -~-  R ,  
IL 
.40 .50 
E > > R ,R~- -~-  R~E,  2°° : 5°~° R ,  
.001 .002 
~-~ 26 36> E, E 200 
E 200 :--5°° R ,E  
R .10 .29) E, B.E .  
Query 5: RW 
.96 .99 
.95 .98 50 
> , A ,A , - - -  
.O5 .10 
.001 .002 
PL 
50__0_0 R ~- R .10 .297 E, 
FPL 
6.__~_4 W ~ E 620 : 320___.~0 
FLL 
60 W t- B ~ 44 RW,  
PL2 
RW,  
16 267 B, B lo~ 44 RW i -  RW mOO5 ,023 
: - -  > B .  
FPL 
? 
>E:  
26 36> E, E 620 : 320___~0 RW I.--- RW .25 .73> E .  
FPL 
The belief in a burglary is reduced now, and much more credit is added to 
the earthquake hypothesis, that is, it explains away the other hypothesis. 
This phenomenon can be observed when we have multiple causes and 
different contexts. In the first situation, only the evidence W was relevant, 
whereas then two evidences R and W were considered. 
Now--a f ter  having done this analysis with available probability intervals 
- - le t  us face the sensitivity issue. To this end we investigate what effect 
exact probabilities, if available, would have. 
The test we perform consists in choosing (hypothetical) exact probabili- 
ties, which are taken to be the middle of each interval in question. The 
outcome of this test is as follows: 
? 
Query 1: W > B ~ 0.020. 
? 
Query 2: W > E ~ 0.003. 
? 
Query 3: W >D ~ 0.077. 
? 
Query 4: RW > B ~ 0.012. 
? 
Query 5: RW > E ~ 0.486. 
A comparison with the query results for the initial intervals reveals that 
only query 5 exhibits unstable behavior. Here the availability of exact 
Robustness of BBNs 71 
probability information changes the computed value from [0.25, 0.73] to 
0.478. But this change is advantageous only if one can be sure of having 
acquired the correct input probabilities. If this is feasible at reasonable 
cost, one should do so; if not, one should face the inherent imprecision of 
the situation described by the interval [0.25, 0.73], instead of providing a 
seemingly very precise value of 0.478 without any basis in reality. 
Finally let us remark that in [28] multiply connected causal graphs are 
also investigated. For Bayesian networks, this task is known to be NP- 
complete, and it must also be NP-complete for the corresponding causal 
programs, since they even allow probability intervals instead of point 
probabilities. 
7. RELATED WORK 
7.1 Influence Diagrams 
In [5] two transformations for node removal and arc reversal in interval 
influence diagrams are presented. Basically, influence diagrams were de- 
veloped for decision analysis--they can be viewed as a special type of 
Bayesian etwork where node removal corresponds to conditional expecta- 
tion and arc removal corresponds to Bayesian conditioning. Instead of 
point probabilities, the authors investigated the use of intervals in influ- 
ence diagrams, whence the name. However, as described there, successive 
transformations will result in weaker bounds. 
7.2 Probability Assessment 
In contrast o [14], we do not relay on computing partial derivatives of 
the target values w.r.t, each of the model parameters; in that way one 
would get "information only about changes in a small neighborhood of the 
assessed values" [14]. Instead we vary the model parameters simultaneously 
within the given bounds. 
7.3 Interval Probability Propagation 
Tessem [24] has investigated the problem of propagating bounds through 
a singly connected Bayesian etwork with multivaried variables, and he has 
provided algorithms which lead to approximate results. His approach is 
more general than ours, since he considers variables with multiple out- 
comes and we have restricted our studies to binary variables. However, his 
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approach fails to compute precise bounds, even in the case of binary 
variables. Let us consider a causal chain 
. . . . . . . .  > 
) , , -  ) ) < . . . . . . . .  ) ) . , -  ) 
;~(c) 
Suppose that A is a causal evidence for C and that E is a diagnostic 
evidence for C. Then the influences and the belief in C are 
or(C) = P(C  I A), 
A(C) = P(E  I C), 
Bel(C) = P(C IAE) .  
or and A messages are propagated in the forward and backward irections, 
respectively. The belief is the product of or, A, and a normalizing constant 
a [18]: 
or(C) = or(B) . P (C  I B)  + or(B) . P (C I B),  
A(C) = P(D I C ) .  A(D) + P (D I C ) .  A(D), 
Bel(C) = a .  7r(C).  A(C), 
where 
= [or (c ) .  ,~(c) + or(C).  ,~(C~)] -~. 
Since or(B) = 1 - or(B) and P (D I C) = 1 - P(D I C), these formulas 
are equivalent to (cf. the Definition 3.1 of f and the Definition 3.9 of h) 
or(C) = f(or( B), P (C I B), P (C I B)) ,  
A(C) = f (P (D  I C), A(D), A(D)), 
BeI(C) = h(or(C), A(C): A(C)). 
Now let P , ( . )  and P*(.) denote lower and upper bounds, respectively, for 
P(-). Then, because of the monotonicity of f and h, we get the following 
lower bounds: 
or, (C) = f ( (or ,  (B),  or*(B)), P ,  (C I B), P ,  (C [ B)),  
A , (C)  =f( (P , (D  I C ) ,P* (D  I C)),  A , (D) ,  A , (D) ) ,  
Bel ,  (C) = h(or,  (C), A, (C) : A*(C)). 
The formulas for upper bounds are similar; we just have to exchange the 
lower and upper asterisks. This result is identical to that given in [24]. 
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However, the derived bounds are not precise, as can be seen in the 
following example. 
EXAMPLE 7.1 (Metastatic ancer reexamined) Consider the chain 
.20 .25) C -ancer ,  Cancer .20 .30 .80 .90 f~ ) ) Tumor, Tumor ) ) Headaches 
.01 .10 .50 .60 
Suppose we have an evidence 
belief in the cancer event. In 
zr, (Cancer)  = .20, 
A, (Tumor) = .80, 
A, = .5o ,  
P ,  (Tumor I Cancer)  = .20, 
P , (Tumor l  Cancer)  = .01, 
for Headaches and we want to compute the 
the above notation, we have 
7r*(Cancer) = .25 ,  
A*(Tumor) = .90, 
h*(T--u-m-0r) = .60, 
P*(Tumor  I Cancer) = .30, 
P* (Tumor  I ~ )  = .10. 
By applying the derived formulas, we get 
A, (Cancer)  = f(( .20, .30), .80, .50) = .56, 
A* (~)  = f(( .10, .01), .90, .60) = .63, 
Be l ,  (Cancer)  = h(.20, .56 : .63) = .18 
Similarly, we get Bel*(Cancer) = .32. But as was shown as an application 
of the bounds propagation methods FPL of Theorem 3.12, the precise 
bounds are tighter: 
Headache .21 .297 Cancer. 
That is, we have Bel(Cancer) ~ [.21,.29]. 
The problem here is that the derived likelihood ratio 
A , (Cancer ) :  A*(Cancer) is not within the admissible region for 
A(Cancer): A(Cancer); see also Figure 1 and the associated iscussion. 
Therefore [24] can only derive sound consequences, which are not precise 
in general. 
Nevertheless the methods in [24] seem to be appropriate when we have 
to deal with variables with multiple outcomes. In these cases, precise 
bounds computation becomes impractical, since we have to deal with 
nonconvex sets, as stated there. 
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7.4 Confidence Intervals 
Spiegelhalter in [22] discusses two approaches to model "imprecise" 
probabilities due to limited knowlege. In this first approach e attaches a
standard eviation to the given probabilities, but only mentions the prob- 
lem how to propagate these confidence intervals through the network. In 
our approach we don't consider confidence intervals, but rather assume 
that the probability lies within the specified interval with certainty. This 
assumption is justified if one chooses the interval arge enough or if one 
considers uccessively arger intervals to get sensitivity results, and it allows 
us to solve the propagation problem. In his second approach Spiegelhalter 
represents he doubt about a conditional probability explicitly by creating a
new event in the network, whose outcome decides the value of the 
uncertain conditional probability. This second approach is further elabo- 
rated in [23]. 
8. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
We have presented an extension of Bayesian networks to probability 
intervals, overcoming one crucial objection against Bayesian inference. 
Our logical approach to Bayesian modeling and inference admits both 
objective and subjective interpretations of probability. Key patterns of 
human reasoning, such as abduction and explaining away, can be modeled 
under imprecise probabilisitic information. The computational effort of 
our local bounds propagation methods is proportional to that in conven- 
tional Bayesian etworks with exact probabilities. An important feature of 
our approach is the ability to perform systematic sensitivity analyses. 
Because an indispensible prerequisite for this is the completeness of the 
inference process, we provided a provably sound and complete set of local 
inference rules which always computes tightest intervals. The results of a 
sensitivity analysis can be employed to figure out chaotic portions of the 
Bayesian etwork, i.e. to unveil those situations where small changes in the 
input probabilities cause large effects on computed output intervals. Such 
behavior is, e.g., characteristic of opposing evidences. By careful remodel- 
ing of the Bayesian etwork a more robust and reliable conceptual model 
of the application domain can be accomplished, rendering decision- 
analysis tools built on top more trustworthy. 
The strictly logical approach to probabilistic modeling and inference we 
have adopted here has another important benefit. As shown in [10] and 
[16], probabilistic reasoning can be intergrated into object-oriented 
database modeling, and its implementation can be realized through deduc- 
tive database optimization techniques [11]. In this way we see a good 
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chance to make Bayesian methods and other uncertainty reasoning ap- 
proaches (like correlation programs [26]) available for information systems 
with uncertain knowledge in a commercial product delivery environment. 
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